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 Firm Growth and Efficiency in the Banking Industry:  
A New Test of the Efficient Structure Hypothesis  
 
 
Abstract 
 
In this paper we propose a new test of the efficient structure (ES) hypothesis, which predicts that 
efficient firms come out ahead in competition and grow as a result.  Our test has significant 
advantages over existing ones, because it is more direct, and can jointly test the so-called quiet-life 
hypothesis, which predicts that in a concentrated market firms do not minimize costs.  We then 
apply this test to large banks in Japan.  Consistent with the ES hypothesis, we find that more 
efficient banks become larger.  We also find that market concentration reduces banks’ efficiency, 
which supports the quiet-life hypothesis.  These findings imply that there is an intriguing 
growth-efficiency dynamic throughout banks’ life cycle, although our findings also suggest that the 
ES hypothesis dominates the quiet-life hypothesis in terms of economic impact. 
 
Keywords: firm growth, cost efficiency, efficient structure hypothesis, quiet-life hypothesis 
 
JEL classification codes: L11, G21 
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1. Introduction 
In this paper we propose a new test of the effcient structure hypothesis, and apply the test to 
large banks in Japan.  As proposed by Demsetz (1973), the efficient structure hypothesis 
(hereafter the ES hypothesis) predicts that under the pressure of market competition, efficient 
firms defeat the competition and grow, so that they become larger, obtain greater market share, 
and earn higher profits.  Under this hypothesis, a market becomes more efficient as it becomes 
more concentrated, so anti-concentration measures cause unnecessary distortion in the economy.  
To test this hypothesis, empirical studies have examined the relation between proxies for firm 
efficiency and for market performance (see, for example, Weiss 1974, and Smirlock 1985, and 
Berger 1995).   
In contrast to this approach, the test we propose in this paper focuses on a core and more 
fundamental feature of the ES hypothesis; i.e., the idea that efficient firms defeat the competiton 
and grow.  The original hypothesis that Demsetz (1973) proposes is a composite hypothesis that 
predicts stages of causal relations from firm efficiency to firm growth, then to market structure, 
and finally to market performance.  In each stage, however, the causality may or may not hold, 
and there might be alternative hypotheses that better explain the data.  For example, although a 
small number of efficient firms might ultimately dominate the market, the market might become 
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temporarily less concentrated if, for example, large inefficient firms lose market share.  Thus, 
testing the reduced-form relation between efficiency and market performance is too rough to 
validate or invalidate the ES hypothesis as a whole. 
Instead of testing the relation between firm efficiency and market performance, we propose to 
examine the causality from firm efficiency to firm growth, which is the key part of the ES 
hypothesis.  To test this relation, we directly regress a measure of firm growth on a measure of 
firm efficiency.  This is thus a more direct test of the ES hypothesis than existing tests, and this 
directness is one of the main contributions of this paper.   
Although the effiicency-growth nexus is at the core of the ES hypothesis, our focus is necessarily 
limited in the sense that we do not examine the other parts of the hypothesis.  However, our focus 
is wider than those in existing studies in another important respect.  In our test, we propose also 
to take into account the determination of firm efficiency -- the key independent variable in the 
growth regression -- by simultaneously estimating an efficiency regression in which the efficiency 
measure is the dependent variable.  The direct merit of this simultaneous estimation is an 
increase in the statistical efficiency of the estimation.  However, it also allows us to test the 
so-called quiet-life hypothesis.   
The quiet-life hypothesis suggests that in a concentrated market firms do not minimize costs 
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because of insufficient managerial effort, lack of profit-maximizing behavior, wasteful expenditures 
to obtain and maintain monopoly power, and/or survival of inefficient managers (Berger and 
Hannan 1998).  To test this hypothesis, we use our efficiency regression to examine whether firms 
in a more concentrated market are more inefficient.  Simultaneous estimation of the growth and 
the efficiency regressions also allows us to take into account the possibility that the effects of the ES 
and the quiet-life hypotheses might co-exist.  Thus, our approach yields economic as well as 
econometric advantages.  This is another main contribution of our paper.1  
Our contribution is not limited to the methodological side, however, because we actually apply 
our test to banks in Japan.  From our empirical analysis, we find that more efficient banks have a 
higher likelihood of becoming larger.  This finding supports the ES hypothesis.  However, we 
also find that banks in more concentrated markets are more inefficient, which is consistent with 
the quiet-life hypothesis.  On balance, our findings imply that efficiency allows firms to survive 
competition and to grow, but the resulting market concentration then erodes firm efficiency.  This 
finding – that both the ES and the quiet-life hypotheses are both supported – is, to our knowledge, 
the first of its kind in the literature.   
These findings raises another question: which effect is more dominant, the effect that efficient 
1 As explained below, our test has some other advantages over existing studies, e.g., a consideration for 
endogeneity. 
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firms grow, or that the resulting concentration deteriorates firm efficiency?.  We find that the 
impact of the ES hypothesis dominates that of the quiet-life hypothesis.  This implies that 
anti-concentration measures might increase inefficiency if they were applied to large banks in 
Japan.  
The rest of the paper proceeds as follows.  In the next section, we review related literature and 
explain our contribution.  Section 3 explains our methodology.  We apply the methodology to 
banks in Japan in section 4.  The final section concludes.   
 
2. Literature 
2.1. Empirical studies on the efficient structure hypothesis 
Earler studies consider the ES hypothesis as an alternative to the classical 
structure-conduct-performance (hereafter SCP) hypothesis.  The SCP hypothesis predicts that a 
concentrated market engenders a low degree of competition, leading to market inefficiency, e.g., 
monopolistic pricing and excess (monopoly) profits.  Similar to the ES hypothesis, the SCP 
hypothesis predicts a positive relation between concentration and profits, but the underlying 
mechanisms are completely different.  Although the the SCP hypothesis implies the need for 
anti-concentration measures, such measures are highly distortinoary under the ES hypothesis. 
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Because the policy implications of these two hypotheses are contrary, earlier studies such as 
Weiss (1974) and Smirlock (1985) test the ES and the SCP hypotheses simultaneously by extending 
the traditional IO framework.  The traditional framework examines the effect of market 
concentration (proxied by market Herfindahl, for example) on market performance (e.g., firm 
profit).  To this framework, the earlier ES studies add market share as an additional independent 
variable, arguing that market share is a proxy for the relative efficiency of the firms.  They then 
claim that the ES hypothesis is supported if the share has a positive effect on profit, but the SCP 
hypothesis is supported if market concentration has a positive effect.2   
However, this approach suffers from serious drawbacks.  First of all, it is unclear whether such 
findings indeed support the two hypotheses as the authors claim.  Market shares, the squared sum 
of which is the Herfindahl index, also reflects market power of the firm, and so it might support the 
SCP hypothesis if market share has a positive impact on profit (Shepherd 1986).3  Second, this 
approach suffers from an identification problem that is well-known for the classical test of the SCP 
2 More recent studies along these lines include Evanoff and Fortier (1988), who take into account entry 
barriers; Tregenna (2009), who uses panel data from the pre-crisis period in the U.S.; Hsieh and Lee 
(2010), who allow the effect of market concentration to vary depending on the factors such as foreign or 
government bank ownership, law and regulation, corporate governance, economic development, and 
intra-industry competition; and Goddard et al. (2010) the main focus of which is profit convergence. 
3 Smirlock et al. (1984) disagree with the idea that market shares reflect market power, but this is mere 
speculation on their part.  Smirlock (1985) additionally uses an interaction term between market 
concentration and market shares to separately identify the two hypotheses, but the reasoning behind 
this identification is again unclear. 
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hypothesis; i.e., we cannot identify a causal relationship by regressing a market performance 
variable on market structure variables (see e.g., Tirole 1988, p.1-2).  Third, although these studies 
implicitly assume that the ES and the SCP hypotheses are alternatives, they might be compatible, at 
least in the short-run.  Finally, as explained in the Introduction, examining the relation between 
market structure and market performance is too rough a test of the ES hypothesis.   
The test that we propose in this paper does not suffer from these drawbacks.  We directly test 
the effect of firm efficiency on firm growth, the core relationship of the ES hypothesis.  In this test, 
we explicitly take into account the endogeneity of the variables, and allow for mutual compatibility 
of the ES hypothesis and the quiet-life hypothesis (which is closely related to the SCP hypothesis). 
To overcome some of the problems of the earlier studies, Berger and Hannan (1989) propose an 
alternative test, which investigates the price-concentration relationship.  Berger and Hannan 
(1989) argure that although both the ES and the SCP hypothesis predict a positive relation between 
profits and market concentration, their implications are different with respect to the 
price-concentration nexus.  The SCP hypothesis predicts that firms have more monopoly power in 
a concentrated market and set higher prices, while the ES hypothesis predicts that in a more 
concentrated market where efficient firms dominate, the market price is lower.  Using data on U.S. 
deposit markets, Berger and Hannan (1989) find a lower interest rate (i.e., a higher price) in a more 
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concentrated market -- a finding, they argue, which is consistent with the SCP hypothesis. 
However, this test also suffers from serious drawbacks.  First, the prediction of the ES 
hypothesis with respect to the price-concentration relationship is unclear.  Although efficient 
firms might set a lower price in order to compete with their rivals, if superior competitive 
performance is unique to the efficient firms and unobtainable to others, efficient firms might set a 
higher price and enjoy more monopoly profits, at least in the short-run.  Second, Berger and 
Hannan (1989) also consider the ES and the SCP hypotheses as being alternatives to each other, 
but the two hypotheses might be compatible, at least in the short-run.4  In the test proposed in 
this paper, we do not focus on the price, and we do not consider the two hypotheses as mutually 
exclusive. 
Berger (1995) proposes yet another (and, in our opinion, the best so far) approach to the ES 
hypothesis.  He proposes to use a measure of cost efficiency as the main explanatory variable in a 
regression model of firm profitability.  Although the use of firm profitability is problematic as 
indicated by Berger and Hannan (1989), Berger (1995) also proposes to run additional regressions 
where market concentration and market shares are a function of the cost efficiency measure.  The 
4 Another problem in Berger and Hannan (1989) is that the price regression ought to have independent 
variables to control for both supply and demand factors.  Brewer and Jackson (2006) deal with this 
issue. 
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ES hypothesis is supported only if the efficiency measure has positive coefficients in all three of his 
regressions (i.e., on profitability, market concentration, and market share).5   
This test of the ES hypothesis in Berger (1995) is more direct than the previous ones in that it 
uses a measure of firm efficiency as we do in this paper.  Berger (1995)’s market share regression 
is also similar to our growth regression, although he does not directly examine firm growth.  
However, as explained above, the effects of efficiency on market concentration and profitability are 
unclear, and in fact, Berger (1995) does not find consistent results across the three regressions.  In 
this paper, we focus on firm growth in order to test the most fundamental relation of the ES 
hypothesis.  Also, Berger (1995) treats the efficiency measure as an exogenous variable, but it is 
more plausible to assume that an efficiency level is endogenously determined.  We explicitly take 
this possibility into account with our efficiency regression.  This also allows us to jointly test the 
ES and the quiet-life hypotheses in a manner that does not consider these to be mutually 
exclusive.6 
 
5 Park and Weber (2006) apply this methodology to Korean banks.  Al-Muharrami and Matthews 
(2009) consider four different approaches that include the tests of Berger and Hannan (1989) and of 
Berger (1995) as special cases. 
6 Note that to test the SCP hypothesis (or the “market power hypotheses” in the paper), Berger (1995) 
adds market concentration and market shares on the right-hand-side of the profitability regression.  
However, this approach is the same as earlier tests of the ES hypothesis such as Weiss (1974) and 
Smirlock (1985), and thus suffers from the drawbacks mentioned above. 
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2.2. Other related studies 
Regarding the market structure-firm efficiency nexus that we examine with our efficiency 
regression, Berger and Hannan (1998) predict that market structure might negatively impact cost 
efficiency, because in a concentrated market firms do not minimize costs, due to insufficient 
managerial effort, lack of profit-maximization behavior, wasteful expenditures to obtain and 
maintain monopoly power, and/or survival of inefficient managers.  They find support for this 
quiet-life hypothesis when they regress a measure of bank efficiency on a measure of market 
concentration (the Herfindahl index).  However, different from our test, Berger and Hannan 
(1998) do not explicitly examine the ES hypothesis.7 
More recent studies focus on the relationship between market power (not necessarily market 
structure) and firm efficiency, by employing elaborate methodologies using various market power 
measures (e.g., Maudos and de Guevara 2007, Turk Ariss 2010 , Schaeck and Chihak 2010, Färe et 
al. 2011, and Koetter et al. 2012).  However, similar to Berger and Hannan (1998), these studies 
are only interested in the impact of market power on firm efficiency, and do not test the ES 
hypothesis as we do in this paper. 
There are some other studies that are methodologically similar to ours.  Jeon and Miller 
7 Note that Berger and Hannan (1998) recognize the possibility of reverse causality, and control for the 
endogeneity of the efficiency variable using instrumental variables. 
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(2005) investigates the co-existence of the market-power hypothesis and the ES hypothesis using a 
VAR model.  However, they use a bivariate VAR model and only examine the relation between a 
market performance measure and a concentration measure.  Casu and Girardone (2009) estimate 
a similar autoregressive model that is composed of competition variables (Lerner index) and 
efficiency variables (cost efficiency measures).  However, the two regressions are separately 
estimated, with no control variables.   
Finally, because we examine the effect of firm efficiency on firm growth, this paper is related to 
the literature on firm growth.  Goddard et al. (2002) test the laws of proportionate effect, which 
are based on an idea of Gibrat (1931) that firms grow stochastically and so every industry sooner or 
later exhibits concentration. 8   However, it is hard to believe that firm growth is a purely 
stochastic phenomenon.  It is more likely that growth is determined by some economic factors 
(which might themselves be stochastic).  In our investigation of the ES hypothesis, we focus on 
firm efficiency as one such factor.  
 
8 Goddard et al. (2004) extend this analysis and examine the simultaneous determination of firm 
growth and profitability. 
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3. Methodology 
3.1. Growth regression to test the ES hypothesis  
To test the core relationship of the ES hypothesis originally articulated by Demsetz (1973), we 
propose to directly investigate the effect of firm efficiency on firm growth.  The main regression, 
the growth regression, takes the following form: 
, 0 1 , 1 2 , ,i t i t i t i tGROWTH EF Xγ γ γ ε−= + + + ,   (1) 
where the indices i and t respectively represent the firm and the time.   
The dependent variable of this regression, GROWTHi,t is a proxy for firm growth.  When we 
apply this test to banks in Japan in the next section, we use the amount and the growth of loans or 
assets as the firm growth proxy.  The term , 1i tEF −  is the measure for firm efficiency.  The above 
specification assumes that the effect of efficiency is realized with a one-year lag.  A vector of 
independent variables ,i tX  consists of control variables such as economic conditions and/or firm 
heterogeneity.  The final term ,i tε  is an ordinary error term.  To test the ES hypothesis, we 
examine whether the coefficient for , 1i tEF −  (i.e., 1γ ) is positive and significant, because the 
hypothesis predicts that efficient firms grow.   
There are several approaches to estimate , 1i tEF − .  They are broadly classified into parametric 
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and non-parametric approaches.9  However, little consensus has been reached with respect to 
which is the best measure.  The choice among different approaches also depends on the 
characteristics of the data used.  As explained below, in our application of this test to banks in 
Japan, we adopt a parametric distribution-free approach that also takes into account time-varying 
fixed effects.   
The original ES hypothesis predicts not only that efficient firms grow, but also that the growth 
of efficient firms makes the market more concentrated.  As explained in the introduction, we do 
not focus on this growth-concentration nexus because, although the market might ultimately be 
concentrated with a small number of efficient firms in a steady state, the relationship between firm 
growth and market concentration is unclear before the steady state is reached.  For example, as 
large inefficient firms lose market share, the market might become temporarily less concentrated.  
We do not focus on the effect on market performance either, because the effect of firm efficiency on 
market performance is also unclear. 
 
9  See for example, Schmidt (1985) and Bauer (1990).  Berger and Humphrey (1997) survey 
methodologies used to estimate bank efficiency.  Berger (2007) compares international evidence on 
bank efficiency.  
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3.2. Efficiency regression to test the quiet-life hypothesis  
To increase the efficiency of our estimation, we run a regression with an efficiency measure on 
the left-hand side: 
, 0 1 1 2 , ,i t t i t i tEF CONC Zβ β β ϖ−= + + + ,   (2) 
where, ,i tZ  is a vector of control variables, and ,i tϖ  is an ordinary error term.   
The main independent variable in this regression is 1tCONC − , a measure for market 
concentration such as the market Herfindahl or the three-firm concentration ratio.  This variable 
allows us to test the quiet-life hypothesis, which predicts that there is a positive relationship 
between market concentration and firm inefficiency, because in a concentrated market firms do not 
minimize costs (Berger and Hannan 1998).  In our test, a negative and significant coefficient for 
1β  is consistent with this hypothesis.   
We simultaneously estimate the regressions (1) and (2).  From an econometric viewpoint, this 
yields the benefit of increasing the efficiency of our estimation.  In addition, the simultaneous 
estimation also gives us important economic insight.  The mechanisms of the ES hypothesis and 
the quiet-life hypothesis might work simultaneously, at least in the short-run.  Our approach 
allows for the two hypotheses to be supported at the same time, which is the case when we find 1γ  
to be positive and 1β  to be negative.   Furthermore, if we find support for the two hypotheses, we 
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can infer the relative strength of the effects of the two hypotheses by comparing the  economic 
significance of the coefficient estimates. 
 
4. Application to Japanese banks 
4.1. Data  
In this section, we apply the methodology proposed in the previous section to banks in Japan 
from the 1974-2005 period (fiscal years).10  Unless otherwise specified, the data used are from 
banks’ financial statements (unconsolidated base) compiled in the Nikkei NEEDS Company (Bank) 
Data File CD-ROM (Nikkei Media Marketing, Inc.).   
Banks in Japan are classified into several types.11  We chose to examine city banks and 
long-term credit banks that operate in a single nationwide market.12  We excluded trust banks 
because they are not ordinary banks, in that they provide trust services.  We excluded other 
smaller banks because they all operate regionally, mainly targeting small- or medium-sized 
enterprises in the region, and so their markets are segmented from those in our sample.13  
10 Fiscal years in Japan start in April and end in the following March.  The duration of the sample 
period shortens in some analysis when we use lagged variables. 
11 See Uchida and Udell (2010) for more information about different types of banks in Japan. 
12 City banks are the largest banks and have nationwide branch networks, and long-term credit banks 
are those legally designated to focus on long-term banking.  There used to be three long-term credit 
banks in Japan, but all of them changed their status to ordinary banks by 2004. 
13 Ishikawa and Tsutsui (2013) report evidence consistent with this market segmentation.  
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The banking industry in Japan has experienced a wave of drastic consolidation since the late 
1990s, and in this period many banks in our sample merged with each other and changed their 
names.  Banks grow when a merger takes place, because the new bank is larger in size than each of 
its predecessors.  However, our focus is on growth due to efficiency, and not on growth due to 
consolidation.  Thus, when new banks emerge due to consolidation, we treat the new banks and 
their predecessors as different entities.  As a result, we have 26 banks in our sample.14   
 
4.2. Specification of the main regressions 
This subsection explains how we specify the two regressions explained in section 3.  The 
descriptive statistics for the variables used below are shown in Table 1. 
 
<<Insert Table 1 about here>> 
 
4.2.1. Growth regression 
To test the ES hypothesis, we use two alternative specifications for equation (1) (growth 
14 The 26 banks are: Industrial Bank of Japan, Long-Term Credit Bank of Japan, Nippon Credit Bank, 
Shinsei Bank, Aozora Bank, Daiichi Kangyo Bank, Mizuho Bank, Mitsui Bank, Sakura Bank, Fuji Bank, 
Mizuho Corporate Bank, Mitsubishi Bank, Tokyo Mitubishi Bank, Kyowa Bank, Asahi Bank, Sanwa 
Bank, UFJ Bank, Sumitomo Bank, Sumitomo Mitsui Banking Corporation, Daiwa Bank, Resona Bank, 
Tokai Bank, Hokkaido Takushoku Bank, Taiyo Kobe Bank, Bank of Tokyo, and Saitama Bank.  Bank of 
Tokyo Mitsubishi UFJ is excluded because we have only one observation for them in our sample period. 
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regression): 
,ln i tL 0 1 , 1 2 3 4 , 5 ,ln
L
i t t t i t t i tEF GDP rc CR INFLγ γ γ γ γ γ ϖ−= + ⋅ + ⋅ + ⋅ + ⋅ + ⋅ + , (3) 
or 
, 0 1 , 1 2 3 4 , 5 ,ln ln
L
i t i t t t i t t i tL EF GDP rc CR INFLγ γ γ γ γ γ ϖ−D = + ⋅ + ⋅D + ⋅D + ⋅D + ⋅D + . (3’) 
The variable ,i tL  is the amount of loans outstanding (in real terms).  We focus on bank growth in 
the lending market, because loans are one of the key products of a bank.15  The key independent 
variable is , 1i tEF − , a measure of banks’ cost efficiency.  Equations (3) and (3’) are alternatives that 
differ in terms of how they measure bank growth.  Equation (3) is a level regression that focuses 
on the effect of , 1i tEF −  on the level of ,i tL .  Equation (3’) is a difference regression that focuses on 
the change (difference) in ,i tL  from the previous period.  In either version, the ES hypothesis is 
supported if we find that 1γ  is positive.  Note that the difference regression controls for 
time-invariant bank fixed effects. 
To estimate the efficiency measure , 1i tEF − , we follow an approach using time-varying bank 
fixed effects (see e.g., Schmidt and Sickels 1984 and Schmidt 1985 for this approach).  First, we 
estimate a cost function that includes time-varying bank fixed effects.  More specifically, we 
include terms such as ( )*i t ia at ≡  *iT ta t+ ⋅ ( ) ( )
2 3* *iTT t iTTT ta at t+ ⋅ + ⋅  in a cost function, where 
15 In a robustness check in subsection 4.4, we focus on growth in bank assets. 
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ia  is a constant that is unique to bank i (indicating bank fixed effects), and *tt  is time trend.16  
We then obtain a cost inefficiency measure as the difference between respective estimates of 
( )*i ta t  and the minimum of them in each year.  Finally, we obtain our measure of cost efficiency 
by reversing the sign of the inefficiency measure and taking the exponential.  More details of our 
derivation for the cost efficiency measure can be found in the Appendix of Homma et al. (2012), 
but two notable advantages of our approach are worth mentioning here: First, we use a parametric 
distribution-free approach, which is more flexible than stochastic-frontier approaches.  Second, 
our efficiency measure is flexible in the sense that it is time-varying.17   
Turning to other explanatory variables, we control for loan supply and loan demand, because 
our dependent variable is the amount of loans.  We use tGDP , real GDP, as a measure of demand.  
For supply variables, we use trc , the call rate, which is an interest rate for the most representative 
interbank market in Japan, and ,i tCR , the capital-asset ratio.  Due to data availability, trc  is the 
interest rate for secured overnight lending before 1985, and for unsecured overnight lending after 
1985.  Also, ,i tCR  is the Basel capital ratio if available, and is 1 – leverage if otherwise.  Finally, 
16 This is the approach of Cornwell et al. (1990), but our measure is more flexible than theirs because 
they do not use the cubic term. 
17 When we estimate the time-invariant efficiency measure by the OLS regression with time-invariant 
bank fixed effects, we find that the estimates are on average smaller than those for the time-variant 
fixed effects used below.  This implies that time-invariant estimation underestimates the efficiency 
measures. 
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we use tINFL , the inflation rate defined as the rate of change of the GDP deflator.  This variable 
might capture a demand as well as a supply factor.  Sources of these data are the SNA from the 
Cabinet Office and the Financial and Economic Statistics Monthly from the Bank of Japan.  In 
equation (3’), we take the first differences of these variables. 
 
4.2.2. Efficiency regression 
Turning to equation (2), the efficiency regression to test the quiet-life hypothesis, we use the 
following two alternative specifications: 
,i tEF 1 1tHIβ −= ⋅ 2 3 4 5SMLBANK MEDBANK LARBANK HUGBANKD D D Dβ β β β+ ⋅ + ⋅ + ⋅ + ⋅  
6 7 8MERGER LTCB FHCD D Dβ β β+ ⋅ + ⋅ + ⋅ 9 iAGEβ+ ⋅  
10 , 11 ,i t i tLA DAβ β+ ⋅ + ⋅ 12 iSDROAβ+ ⋅ ,
U
i tϖ+ .   (4) 
or 
,i tEFD 1 1tHIβ −= ⋅ 2 3 4 5SMLBANK MEDBANK LARBANK HUGBANKD D D Dβ β β β+ ⋅ + ⋅ + ⋅ + ⋅  
6 7 8MERGER LTCB FHCD D Dβ β β+ ⋅ + ⋅ + ⋅ 9 iAGEβ+ ⋅ 10 , 11 ,i t i tLA DAβ β+ ⋅D + ⋅D  
 12 iSDROAβ+ ⋅ ,
U
i tϖ+ .     (4’) 
In these equations, the dependent variable is the measure of cost efficiency ,i tEF  (or its 
one-year difference).  The key independent variable is 1tHI − , the market Herfindahl (representing 
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market concentration), calculated using each bank’s nominal amount of loans outstanding.  
Equation (4) (the level regression) focuses on the effect of 1tHI −  on the level of efficiency, and 
equation (4’) (the difference regression) focuses on its effect on the change in the efficiency level.  
These equations are simultaneously estimated with equation (3) or (3’), respectively.  Either in 
equation (4) or (4’), the quiet-life hypothesis predicts a negative coefficient for 1β .   
For control variables, we use several bank-specific characteristics.  Dummy variables SMLBANKD , 
MEDBANKD , LARBANKD , and HUGBANKD  respectively indicate that the relevant bank is a small, 
medium-sized, large, or huge bank.  The cut-offs for these size categories are 15 trillion yen, 40 
trillion yen, and 65 trillion yen in nominal assets.  We use all four dummies, and do not include an 
intercept in equation (4) or (4’).   
A dummy variable MERGERD  takes a value of unity if the relevant bank has ever experienced a 
merger before the relevant year.  This variable captures the effect that consolidation increases cost 
efficiency.  A dummy variable LTCBD  takes a value of unity if the relevant bank is a long-term 
credit bank.  Another dummy variable FHCD  indicates that the bank is affiliated with a financial 
holding company.  Firm age is represented by iAGE .   
We also include some financial variables.  Two financial ratios are used to capture the 
difference in efficiency levels due to banks’ varying dependence on traditional deposit-to-loan 
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business models: ,i tLA  is the ratio of total loans to total assets, and ,i tDA  is the ratio of total 
deposits to total assets.  To control for bank risk, we use iSDROA , the standard deviation of ROA 
over the sample period.  
 
4.2.3.  Additional specification and estimation method 
In addition to the baseline specifications explained above, we estimate the equations by 
allowing for different impacts of the key independent variables for different time periods.  
Specifically, we add interaction terms between our key independent variables (i.e., , 1i tEF −  in 
equation (3) or (3’) and 1tHI −  in equation (4) or (4’)) and three dummy variables, 
7689 9000,D D and 
0105D , which respectively take the value of unity for the periods 1976-89, 1990-2000, and 
2001-2005.  The first period corresponds to the period when deregulation measures were taken, 
and includes the famous “Japanese bubble” occurred.  The second period corresponds to the 
post-bubble period, which saw a serious economic slump and financial crisis.  The third period is 
a period of recovery from that slump. 
For each specification, we simultaneously estimate the growth and the efficiency regressions by 
Generalized Method of Moments (GMM).  In doing so, we deal with many potential problems in 
the estimation.  First, we explicitly control for heterosckedascity of the error terms.  Second, we 
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correct for serial correlation when it is found.  This is of particular importance because our panel 
data have large T (time period).   
We also take into account possible endogeneity of some variables by using different 
instrumental variables for each equation.  Although either of our two dependent variables enter in 
the other equation as an independent variable, we cannot completely rule out the possibility that 
some other independent variables are endogenous variables due to reverse causality. 18   As 
instruments, we use the individual bank dummies for both equations, 1ln tGDP− , trc , , 1i tCR − , 
tINFL , , 1i tEF − , (or 
7689
, 1i tEF D− ⋅ , 
9000
, 1i tEF D− ⋅ , and 
0105
, 1i tEF D− ⋅  when these interaction terms 
are used) for the growth regression, and 1tHI − , SMLBANKD , MEDBANKD , LARBANKD , MARGERD , FHCD , 
, 1i tLA − , , 1i tDA −  (or 
7689
1tHI D− ⋅ , 
9000
1tHI D− ⋅ , and 
0105
1tHI D− ⋅ ) for the efficiency regression. 
Note that in dealing with this endogeneity problem, our approach has methodological 
advantages over the ordinary ones.  Ordinary approaches are based on the estimation of a 
stochastic frontier cost function, and thus the inefficiency term follows a specific distribution.  In 
this case, it is extremely difficult to cope with the endogeneity problem, because the overall 
likelihood function is difficult to derive.  For example, one needs to specify the generating process 
18 Such variables include, for example, ln tGDP  and ,i tCR  in equation (3), ln tGDPD  and ,i tCRD  
in equation (3’), ,i tLA  and ,i tDA  in equation (4), and ,i tLA  and ,i tDA  in equation (4’). 
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of the endogenous variables as well as a joint distribution of the inefficiency term and other error 
terms.    
 
4.3. Results  
4.3.1. Level regressions 
The estimation results are shown in Table 2.  In this table, panel (A) reports the results for the 
simultaneous estimation of the level equations (3) and (4).  In each panel, column (i) shows the 
results for the baseline regression, and column (ii) shows those when we interact the key 
independent variables with the three period dummies 7689 9000,D D and 0105D .  The test statistic 
for the overidentification restriction is far from significant (the p-value is 0.58).  Therefore, we 
cannot reject the null hypothesis of overidentification.  This means that the likelihood that there is 
an error in the specification of the two equations is small.   
 
<<Insert Table 2 about here>> 
 
The coefficients of interest are those for , 1i tEF −  (in each subperiod) in the growth regression, 
and for 1tHI −  (in each subperiod) in the efficiency regression.  From column (i) of panel (A), we 
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see that the coefficient on , 1i tEF −  is positive and significant.  This means that efficient banks 
become larger.  This finding lends support to the ES hypothesis.  As for the quiet-life hypothesis, 
we find that the coefficient for 1tHI −  is negative and significant.  This finding means that banks 
in a more concentrated market become more inefficient, which is consistent with the quiet-life 
hypothesis.   
Turning to column (ii), we find that the effect of , 1i tEF −  on bank growth is always positive and 
significant even when we divide the sample period.  The impact is the largest in the middle of the 
three sub-periods, and the smallest in the 2001-2005 period.  In the efficiency regression, the 
hypothesis is supported in the 1990-2000 and the 2001-2005 periods, since 1tHI −  has a negative 
coefficient for , 1i tEF −  in these periods.  We also find that the coefficient is the largest in the 
1990s-2000 period, so the deterioration of efficiency due to market concentration is the highest in 
the 1990s.  The sign of the point estimate is opposite in the 1976-1989 period, but is statistically 
insignificant.   
 
4.3.2. Difference regressions 
The results for the difference regression are shown in panel (B) of Table 2.  They are on 
balance similar to, and consistent with, those in panel (A).  In column (i) where we report the 
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results for equation (3’) and (4’), the ES hypothesis is supported, since the coefficient for , 1i tEF −  is 
positive and statistically significant.  The coefficient for 1tHI −  in the efficiency regression is again 
negative and significant, so the quiet-life hypothesis is also supported.  In column (ii) where we 
allow for different impacts of the main independent variables in the three sub-periods, we find that 
the main results are qualitatively unchanged.  The only difference between panel (A) and panel 
(B) is that the coefficient for 76891tHI D− ⋅  is now negative and significant.  
We also find that the control variables generally have the anticipated impacts on the dependent 
variables, and that these effects are statistically significant.  The amount of loans (lnLi,t or ΔlnLi,t) 
is larger when loan demand is larger (larger GDP), or when loan supply is larger (a smaller 
interbank lending rate or a higher capital ratio (panel (A) only)).  Banks are more efficient when 
they are large (but not huge), probably due to economies of scale.  Post-merger banks are more 
efficient, probably because the merger enables them to cut costs; long-term credit banks are more 
efficient, probably because they are less dependent on deposit funding; and banks affiliated with a 
financial holding company are less efficient, probably because of their complex and hierarchical 
organizational structure.  We also find that younger banks and less risky banks are more efficient, 
and banks with a higher loan to asset ratio or deposit to asset ratio are more efficient. 
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4.3.3.  Simultaneous versus separate estimation 
In theory, the simultaneous estimation of the growth and the efficiency regressions increases 
the efficiency of the estimation.  To check whether this is indeed the case, we ran the two 
regressions separately and compared the results with the ones above.  What we expected was that 
the findings above would be qualitatively the same in terms of the signs and the magnitudes of the 
estimated parameters for important variables, but that the t-values for the parameters would be 
larger in absolute values for the joint estimation than for the separate estimations.   
 
<<Insert Table 3 about here>> 
 
Table 3 reports the results for the separate estimations for the growth and the efficiency 
regressions by GMM.  We find that the expectations above generally hold, especially for the 
difference regressions in panel (B).  The results for the coefficients of the key variables in panel 
(B) are qualitatively similar to those in Table 2, and have smaller t-values.  However, there are 
some exceptions in the case of the level regressions (panel (A)).  Inconsistent with the above 
expectations, the coefficients for , 1i tEF −  in the growth regressions with and without the interaction 
terms are negative and/or statistically significant, and some coefficients for 1tHI −  in the efficiency 
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regression with the interaction terms are positive and statistically significant.   
However, we also find that the null hypothesis of the test for overidentification is rejected for 
the growth regression in panel (A).  This means that in the case of separate estmation of the level 
regressions, the growth regression suffers from mis-specification.  On balance, the results from 
the simultaneous estimation are more believable, because, as we have already seen above, it does 
not suffer from serious miss-specification, and therefore the parameter estimates are consistent. 
 
4.3.4. Economic implication 
On balance, our findings support both the ES and the quiet-life hypotheses.  These findings are 
robust to alternative measures of bank growth (i.e., levels or differences).  Note that as discussed 
above, the two hypotheses are not mutually exclusive in theory, at least in the short run.  However, 
existing empirical studies did not allow for this possibility.  This paper is therefore the first study 
to find evidence supporting both hypotheses at once. 
Our findings are intriguing from an economic point of view.  The finding for the ES hypothesis 
implies that efficient banks grow more.  However, if the banking market becomes more 
concentrated due to the growth of such (efficient) banks, the finding for the quiet-life hypothesis 
then implies that the banks lose efficiency.  As they become inefficient, they then lose the size they 
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had previously gained (the ES hypothesis).  In this manner, our findings seem to imply the 
existence of an interesting cyclical dynamic of banks growth and decline, due to the interaction 
between growth and efficiency. 
To further pursue this possibility, we calculate the economic impact of the two hypotheses.  
For the ES hypothesis, when we focus on the results for the baseline specification in Table 2 
(column (i) of panel A,), the point estimate for the coefficient for , 1i tEF −  in the growth regression 
is 1.643.  This indicates that for an average bank, an increase in the cost efficiency measure by one 
standard deviation (0.150) leads to an increase in ,ln i tL  by 0.246, which is equivalent to a 
1.279-fold increase in ,i tL .  The impact is therefore economically significant. 
The economic significance of the impact of the quiet-life hypothesis can be calculated similarly.  
As shown in the same column in Table 2, the point estimate for the coefficient for 1tHI −  in the 
efficiency regression is -0.684.  Because the standard deviation of the Herfindahl index for the 
30-year period (1976-2005, N=30) is 0.074, an increase in the index by one standard deviation 
leads to a decrease in ,i tEF  by 0.050.  Because the standard deviation of ,i tEF  is 0.150, we can 
conclude that the economic impact of the quiet-life hypothesis is less significant than that of the ES 
hypothesis.  Although this comparison depends on different assumptions, it suggests that the 
economic impact of the ES hypothesis dominates that of the quiet-life hypothesis.  Note that this 
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finding has an important policy implication.  It implies that anti-concentration measures might 
increase inefficiency in the economy. 
 
4.4. Robustness check  
4.4.1. Alternative measure for bank growth 
In this subsection, we check the robustness of our findings using yet another measure of bank 
growth.  Instead of focusing on bank growth in terms of loan size, we now focus on growth in 
terms of asset size.  For this check, we estimate the same equations ((3) and (4) or (3’) and (4’)) 
but replace ,i tL  with ,i tA , the size of banks’ assets.   
 
<<Insert Table 4 about here>> 
 
Table 4 shows the results when we focus on asset growth.  Again, panels (A) and (B) 
respectively report the results for the level regressions (equations (3) and (4)) and for the 
difference regressions (equations (3’) and (4’)), and in each panel columns (i) and (ii) are 
respectively for the specification without and with the interaction terms between our key 
independent variables and the period dummies.   
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We can see that the results for the ES and the quiet-life hypotheses are robust to this alternative 
specification.  Compared with Table 2, the coefficients for the main independent variables ( , 1i tEF −  
and 1tHI − ) have the same signs and comparable significance levels, the only exception being the 
effect of , 1i tEF −  on asset growth during the 1990s.  On balance, irrespective of whether we 
measure bank growth by loan size or by asset size, both the ES hypothesis and the quiet-life 
hypothesis are supported.  This reinforces our conclusions from the previous section. 
 
4.4.2. Effect of bank consolidation 
Although our findings thus far are consistent with the ES and the quiet-life hypotheses, we 
cannot rule out the possibility that these findings are derived from a different mechanism.19  
Because there has been significant consolidation among our sample banks, we assign different 
identification to banks before and after mergers.  This very approach might create the 
relationships we find among our main variables, even if the ES and the quiet-life hypotheses did 
not hold.   
Suppose, for example, that two banks merged and improved their cost efficiency.  Suppose also 
that there are other banks whose efficiency did not change before and after this merger event.  
19 This is a possibility that helpfully suggested by an anonymous referee.  
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Under our approach, if the efficiency of the merged bank significantly improved, efficiency of the 
other banks deteriorates because our efficiency measure is a relative measure defined vis-à-vis the 
most efficient bank in the same year.  At the same time, industry concentration would also 
increases due to the merger.  Taken together, such mergers might give rise to a negative 
correlation between market concentration and the average efficiency of sample banks. 
In our estimation, this concern might be mitigated to some extent, because we use one-year lags 
of the main independent variables, and so the findings are not caused by the above mechanism 
insofar as it operates only in the same year.  Also, in the efficiency regression, we directly control 
for the effect of efficiency improvement after mergers using the merger dummy, MERGERD .   
However, we cannot yet completely rule out the possibility that the effect of consolidation drives 
our findings to some degree.  Thus, to take into account this concern more seriously, we check the 
change in the efficiency levels of the banks that experienced mergers.  More specifically, we check 
(1) whether the most efficient bank in each year is a bank that has just experienced a merger, and 
(2) if so, whether the efficiency of the bank improved in a significant manner after the merger.  
The above concern is significant if the answers to these questions are both yes.  
Regarding the first question, we find that out of our 31 sample fiscal-years, there are only three 
years in which the bank that had just experienced a merger is the most efficient bank: (i) Sakura 
32 
 
Bank in FY 1991, (ii) Asahi Bank in FY1992, and (iii) Mizuho Corporate Bank in FY2003.  There 
were five other merger events in our sample, but in these cases, post-merger banks were not the 
most efficient banks.20  This means that the concern above is not likely the main driver of our 
findings.   
To answer question (2) for the three most-efficient banks that did merge in our sample, we also 
compare the levels of their cost efficiency before and after the mergers.  By definition, the 
efficiency measure takes the value of 1.0 for the year’s most efficient bank.  The levels of the 
measures of the predecessors of the three banks are (i) 0.80 (Mitsui Bank) and 0.95 (Taiyo Kobe 
Bank), (ii) 0.97 (Kyowa Bank) and 1.00 (Saitama Bank), and (iii) 0.56 (Industrial Bank of Japan), 
0.79 (Daiichi Kanogyo Bank), and 0.83 (Fuji Bank).  Compared with the standard deviation of the 
efficiency measure, which is 0.15 (see Table 1), those improvements are not very large.  On 
balance, these findings imply that the efficiency improvement after mergers is not the primary 
driver of our main findings, and lend supports to our interpretation that the ES and the quiet-life 
hypotheses drive the findings.  
 
20 The five cases are: Bank of Tokyo Mitsubishi in FY1997, UFJ Bank in FY 2001, Mitsui Sumitomo 
Bank in FY2002, Resona Bank in FY2003, and Mizuho Bank in FY 2003. 
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5. Conclusion  
This paper proposes a new test of the efficient structure (ES) hypothesis.  This test has many 
advantages over those in existing studies, because it directly examines the relationship between 
firm efficiency and firm growth, and simultaneously tests the quiet-life hypothesis.   
Applying this test to data on large banks in Japan, we consistently find that more efficient banks 
tend to become larger, which is consistent with the efficient structure hypothesis.  We also find 
that market concentration erodes banks’ cost efficiency, which is consistent with the quiet-life 
hypothesis.  These findings imply that banks undergo an intriguing life-cycle dynamic: Banks 
grow rapidly as they become more efficient, but the resulting market concentration assures a “quiet 
life” for banks, which makes them lose efficiency and shrink.  That said, we also find that the 
economic impact of the quiet-life hypothesis is less significant than that of the ES hypothesis, 
implying that anti-concentration measures might increase inefficiency in the economy.   
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Definition Source # of obs. Mean Std Dev Minimum Maximum
 Real loans outstanding = loans outstanding / GDPdeflator (million yen) (a), (b) 384 16,039,100 10,597,000 2,559,613 56,489,700
Cost effiicency measure Our calculation(see Appendix) 384 0.772 0.150 0.424 1.000
Real GDP (b) 384 392,717 88,959 247,834 548,249
Call rate (interbank rate) (collateralized rate before
1986 and uncollateralized rate afterwards) (c) 384 0.029 0.014 0.007 0.127
Regulatory capital ratio (if unavailable, capital/assets) (a) 384 0.035 0.029 0.007 0.142
Inflation rate (the rate of change in GDP deflator) (b) 384 0.017 0.024 -0.03 0.078
Hirfindahl index (market concentration measure) (a) 384 0.087 0.04 0.071 0.424
 Small bank dummy (= 1 if total assets < 15 trillion yen) (a) 384 0.346 0.476 (NA) (NA)
Medium bank dummy (= 1 if 15 trillion yen =< total
assets < 40 trillion yen) (a) 384 0.391 0.489
(NA) (NA)
Large bank dummy (= 1 if 40 trillion yen =< total
assets < 65 trillion yen) (a) 384 0.224 0.417
(NA) (NA)
Huge bank dummy  (= 1 if total assets >= 65 trillion
yen) (a) 384 0.039 0.194
(NA) (NA)
Merger dummy (= 1 if the bank experienced a merger)
Hand collected
(different
sources)
384 0.094 0.292 (NA) (NA)
LTCB dummy (= 1 if the bank is a long-term credit
bank)
Hand collected
(different
sources)
384 0.201 0.401 (NA) (NA)
Holding company dummy (= 1 if the bank is affiliated
with a financial holding company)
Hand collected
(different
sources)
384 0.057 0.233 (NA) (NA)
Bank age
Hand collected
(different
sources)
384 65.479 28.111 3.083 104.833
Loans/assets (a) 384 0.568 0.072 0.330 0.732
Deposits/assets (a) 384 0.581 0.197 0.132 0.794
Standard deviation of ROA (ROA= (total interest
income - total interest expenses - ordinary costs)/assets） (a) 384 0.002 0.001 0.000 0.003
Table 1　Descriptive statistics for simultaneous estimation
Variables
Efficiency Hypothesis
regression
Quiet-life Hypothesis
regression
Data sources: (a) Nikkei NEEDS CD-ROM, (b) SNA of the Cabinet Office, (c) Financial and economic statistics monthly of the Bank of Japan.
, ,L i ty
, 1i tEF −
tGDP
trc
tCR
tINFL
SMLBANKD
MEDBANKD
LARBANKD
HUGBANKD
MERGERD
FHCD
iAGE
,i tLA
,i tDA
iSDROA
1tHI −
LTCBD
0AO 
0AO 
0AO 
0AO 
0AO 
0AO 
0AO 
0AO 
0AO 
0AO 
0AO 
0AO 
0AO 
0AO 
0AO 
0AO 
0AO 
0AO 
Estimate t-statistic Estimate t-statistic Estimate t-statistic Estimate t-statistic
(intercept) -9.3568 -4.9937 *** -9.7267 -5.0949 *** (intercept) -0.0716 -4.3809 *** -0.0610 -2.9994 ***
EF i ,t -1 1.6429 26.7299 *** EF i ,t -1 0.0741 4.1062 ***
EF i ,t -1*D
7689 1.4803 22.8522 *** EF i ,t -1*D
7689 0.1144 6.3861 ***
EF i ,t -1*D
9000 1.7363 26.4944 *** EF i ,t -1*D
9000 0.0461 2.4200 **
EF i ,t -1*D
0105 1.3702 27.6018 *** EF i ,t -1*D
0105 0.0541 2.0677 **
lnGDP t 1.9358 13.4672 *** 1.9622 13.3719 *** ∆lnGDP t 1.9404 6.1116 *** 1.2298 4.1799 ***
rc t -29.1109 -42.2625 *** -26.3154 -36.3041 *** ∆rc t 0.2540 0.3687 -0.8406 -1.6572 *
CR i,t 10.6659 22.0355 *** 10.6968 22.6059 *** ∆CR i,t -1.6677 -2.4387 ** -0.2083 -0.5230
INFL t 1.0935 0.8749 2.3538 2.0566 ** ∆INFL t -0.0498 -0.3195 -0.0990 -0.9283
HI i ,t -1 -0.6842 -6.5825 *** HI i ,t -1 -0.9472 -19.8616 ***
HI i ,t -1*D
7689 0.1529 0.4262 HI i ,t -1*D
7689 -2.2824 -11.6058 ***
HI i ,t -1*D
9000 -1.4574 -4.5602 *** HI i ,t -1*D
9000 -1.8475 -12.3069 ***
HI i ,t -1*D
0105 -0.4329 -3.6786 *** HI i ,t -1*D
0105 -1.1408 -29.4724 ***
D SMLBANK 0.2272 7.3620 *** 0.1331 3.2526 *** D SMLBANK 0.0919 8.5882 *** 0.1809 11.9026 ***
D MEDBANK 0.2671 9.3913 *** 0.2165 5.5281 *** D MEDBANK 0.0969 9.5025 *** 0.1784 11.7840 ***
D LARBANK 0.4209 14.8058 *** 0.3913 9.9878 *** D LARBANK 0.1050 8.7632 *** 0.1694 11.2464 ***
D HUGBANK 0.2215 7.0374 *** 0.2074 4.7401 *** D HUGBANK 0.1079 8.4225 *** 0.1687 12.3409 ***
D MERGER 0.0548 4.5290 *** 0.0500 3.0520 *** D MERGER 0.0096 1.4041 0.0157 3.0676 ***
D LTCB 0.2235 9.0928 *** 0.1283 4.8876 *** D LTCB 0.0036 0.5060 -0.0001 -0.0182
D FHC -0.0566 -4.8623 *** -0.0875 -4.5692 *** D FHC 0.0387 5.5857 *** 0.0112 1.5361
AGE t -0.0002 -1.6451 * -0.0002 -1.0930 AGE t -0.0001 -1.0165 0.00004 0.6584
LA i,t 0.3701 6.8200 *** 0.7255 9.1481 *** ∆LA i,t -0.0919 -0.6092 -0.4502 -3.7898 ***
DA i,t 0.6696 16.4805 *** 0.4426 8.8203 *** ∆DA i,t 0.7781 6.0029 *** 0.2123 1.9406 *
SDROA i -55.5862 -8.7794 *** -59.6685 -10.7600 *** SDROA i -9.2732 -2.2257 ** -8.5338 -3.2575 ***
NA
NA
NA
NA
NA
NA
0.1155 0.1153 0.1175
10 3
R2      0.4928 (Efficiency regression)       0.3545 (Efficiency regression)
NA
NA
NA
NA
384 384
0.1289
NA
NA
NA
NA
NA
      0.4690 (Growth regression)
      0.5191 (Efficiency regression)
NA
44.3696 49.5029
[0.582] [0.586] [0.551] [0.374]
384 384
10
44.2691 45.1245
(A) Dependent variable: ln L i,t  for the growth regression and EF i,t  for the efficiency regression (B) Dependent variable: Δln L i,t  for the growth regression and ΔEF i,t  for the efficiency regression
Independent variableIndependent variable
      0.4420 (Efficiency regression)
(i) Baseline regression (ii) With period dummies (i) Baseline regression
      0.4148 (Growth regression)       0.4639 (Growth regression)
Order of MA for the error
term
Test for overidentification
[P value]
(ii) With period dummies
Growth
regression
Efficiency
regression
Growth
regression
Efficiency
regression
5
      0.2728 (Growth regression)
Value function
This table shows the results for the GMM estimation of the growth and the efficiency regressions. The dependent variable in the growth regression is banks' loan level lnL i,t (in Panel (A)) or loan growth ΔlnL i,t (in Panel
(B)). The main independent variable is the bank efficiency measure EFi,t -1 (in column (i)) or its interactions with period dummies (in column (ii)). The dependent variable in the efficiency regression is the bank efficiency
measure EFi,t  and the main independnt variable is the measure for market concentration (Hirfindahl index) HIi,t -1 (in column (i)) or its interactions with period dummies (in column (ii)). For more detailed definitions of
these and other variables, see Section 4.2.   ***, **, and * respectively represent that the estimated coefficient is significant at a 1%, 5%, and 10% level.
Table 2.  Estimation results for the growth and the efficiency regressions
Obs.
Order of MA for the error
term
Test for overidentification
[P value]
Value function
R2
Obs.
7689
1γ
9000
1γ
0105
1γ
2γ
3γ
4γ
5γ
1β
7689
1β
9000
1β
0105
1β
2β
4β
5β
6β
7β
8β
9β
10β
11β
11β 2
0γ
1γ
Estimate t-statistic Estimate t-statistic Estimate t-statistic Estimate t-statistic
(intercept) -14.3526 -6.9085 *** -6.8037 -1.6724 * (intercept) -0.0577 -3.2177 *** -0.0652 -2.8095 ***
EF i ,t -1 -0.1538 -0.9075 EF i ,t -1 0.0564 2.9072 ***
EF i ,t -1*D
7689 -0.3177 -1.8215 * EF i ,t -1*D
7689 0.1016 5.3263 ***
EF i ,t -1*D
9000 0.0677 0.4486 EF i ,t -1*D
9000 0.0404 1.8945 *
EF i ,t -1*D
0105 -0.4320 -2.8236 *** EF i ,t -1*D
0105 0.0445 1.5457
lnGDP t 2.4322 15.1727 *** 1.8485 5.9070 *** ∆lnGDP t 1.9046 5.7189 *** 1.6005 4.7206 ***
rc t -27.3955 -13.1923 *** -26.7881 -66.1332 *** ∆rc t 0.0485 0.0594 -1.6316 -2.0931 **
CR i,t 8.3746 7.6323 *** 9.1100 9.3322 *** ∆CR i,t -1.2069 -1.6419 0.6651 1.0802
INFL t 3.2961 2.6649 *** 1.2774 0.9980 ∆INFL t 0.0613 0.3782 0.0612 0.4863
HI i ,t -1 -0.5053 -5.9720 *** HI i ,t -1 -0.9375 -13.4537 ***
HI i ,t -1*D
7689 1.3379 3.0825 *** HI i ,t -1*D
7689 -2.3411 -8.0039 ***
HI i ,t -1*D
9000 0.5613 1.6477 * HI i ,t -1*D
9000 -1.9275 -8.6050 ***
HI i ,t -1*D
0105 -0.1587 -1.6429 * HI i ,t -1*D
0105 -1.1525 -16.2888 ***
D SMLBANK 0.1562 1.5670 -0.0590 -0.4916 D SMLBANK 0.1108 8.4130 *** 0.1963 8.1017 ***
D MEDBANK 0.1524 1.5380 -0.0527 -0.4471 D MEDBANK 0.1113 8.8538 *** 0.1929 7.9878 ***
D LARBANK 0.2491 2.5798 *** 0.0519 0.4487 D LARBANK 0.1168 8.0724 *** 0.1925 7.7650 ***
D HUGBANK 0.0271 0.2714 -0.1820 -1.5172 D HUGBANK 0.1190 6.3114 *** 0.1853 8.1704 ***
D MERGER 0.0186 0.7975 0.0217 0.8687 D MERGER 0.0027 0.3636 0.0092 1.3228
D LTCB 0.1616 3.0005 *** 0.1706 3.0055 *** D LTCB 0.0110 1.3309 0.0017 0.2225
D FHC -0.0013 -0.1024 0.0366 1.9345 * D FHC 0.0350 2.9982 *** -0.0002 -0.0189
AGE t -0.0008 -2.5343 ** -0.0008 -2.5106 ** AGE t -0.0002 -2.5744 *** -0.00006 -0.7767
LA i,t 0.4991 7.0158 *** 0.5907 6.0412 *** ∆LA i,t -0.0976 -0.6270 -0.4187 -2.4708 **
DA i,t 0.7286 6.5241 *** 0.7732 6.4561 *** ∆DA i,t 0.5802 3.3399 *** 0.1986 1.3454
SDROA i -29.3664 -2.2950 ** -22.5850 -1.7175 * SDROA i -15.4088 -3.1260 *** -10.7552 -2.2722 **
NA
NA
NA
NA
NA
NA
       0.0685 (Efficiency reg.)     0.0718 (Efficiency reg.)      0.0775 (Efficiency reg.)
          10 (Efficiency reg.)           3 (Efficiency reg.)
Adjusted R2      0.6434 (Efficiency reg.)       0.3791 (Efficiency reg.)
         384 (Growth reg.)
       0.1070 (Growth reg.)
     0.0792 (Efficiency reg.)
NA
NA
NA
NA
NA
      0.4392 (Growth reg.)
      0.6336 (Efficiency reg.)
NA
  41.0963 [0.022] (Growth reg.)
  26.3184 [0.238] (Efficiency reg.)   27.5612 [0.191] (Efficiency reg.)   29.7675 [0.124] (Efficiency reg.)   30.4253 [0.108] (Efficiency reg.)
         384 (Efficiency reg.)           384 (Efficiency reg.)
  36.0426 [0.071] (Growth reg.)   21.1923 [0.682] (Growth reg.)
          384 (Efficiency reg.)           384 (Efficiency reg.)
(i) Baseline regression (ii) With period dummies (i) Baseline regression
      0.5311 (Growth reg.)       0.5559 (Growth reg.)
  28.9610 [0.266] (Growth reg.)
NA
NA
NA
NA
Efficiency
regression
Growth
regression
Efficiency
regression
          5 (Efficiency reg.)
      0.2826 (Growth reg.)
(A) Dependent variable: ln L i,t  for the growth regression and EF i,t  for the efficiency regression (B) Dependent variable: Δln L i,t  for the growth regression and ΔEF i,t  for the efficiency regression
Independent variableIndependent variable
      0.4401 (Efficiency reg.)
This table shows the results for the separate GMM estimation of the growth and the efficiency regressions.  The dependent variable in the growth regression is banks' loan level lnL i,t  (in Panel (A)) or loan growth  ΔlnL i,t  (in
Panel (B)). The main independent variable is the bank efficiency measure EFi,t -1 (in column (i)) or its interactions with period dummies (in column (ii)). The dependent variable in the efficiency regression is the bank
efficiency measure EFi,t  and the main independnt variable is the measure for market concentration (Hirfindahl index) HIi,t -1 (in column (i)) or its interactions with period dummies (in column (ii)). For more detailed
definitions of these and other variables, see Section 4.2.   ***, **, and * respectively represent that the estimated coefficient is significant at a 1%, 5%, and 10% level.
Table 3.  Separate estimation results for the growth and the efficiency regressions
Test for overidentification
[P value]
Adjusted R2
Value function
Test for overidentification
[P value]
(ii) With period dummies
Growth
regression
Obs.
          384 (Growth reg.)
          10 (Efficiency reg.)
Order of MA for the error
term
          10 (Growth reg.)          10 (Growth reg.)
    0.0939 (Growth reg.)
Obs.
          384 (Growth reg.)           384 (Growth reg.)
Order of MA for the error
term
          3 (Growth reg.)           5 (Growth reg.)
Value function
     0.0552 (Growth reg.)      0.0754 (Growth reg.)
7689
1γ
9000
1γ
0105
1γ
2γ
3γ
4γ
5γ
1β
7689
1β
9000
1β
0105
1β
2β
4β
5β
6β
7β
8β
9β
10β
11β
11β 2
0γ
1γ
Estimate t-statistic Estimate t-statistic Estimate t-statistic Estimate t-statistic
(intercept) -7.5958 -4.0937 *** -8.4228 -3.9375 *** (intercept) -0.0711 -6.3981 *** -0.1075 -4.4869 ***
EF i ,t -1 1.3579 22.0450 *** EF i ,t -1 0.0415 4.0365 ***
EF i ,t -1*D
7689 1.2955 15.3250 *** EF i ,t -1*D
7689 0.0885 5.4116 ***
EF i ,t -1*D
9000 1.4232 20.9330 *** EF i ,t -1*D
9000 0.0282 1.5050
EF i ,t -1*D
0105 1.1889 19.3441 *** EF i ,t -1*D
0105 0.0966 4.1645 ***
lnGDP t 1.8625 13.1084 *** 1.9217 11.7809 *** ∆lnGDP t 2.7817 7.6949 *** 3.1306 5.4440 ***
rc t -30.0980 -74.4652 *** -28.0184 -53.5050 *** ∆rc t -3.4835 -4.0774 *** -6.8801 -5.5926 ***
CR i,t 11.2982 28.0618 *** 11.6685 29.9260 *** ∆CR i,t 0.5773 0.6405 4.3528 5.0199 ***
INFL t 1.4611 1.1724 2.5429 2.1276 ** ∆INFL t 0.1226 0.6490 0.1278 0.7298
HI i ,t -1 -0.6066 -6.6838 *** HI i ,t -1 -0.9702 -21.2590 ***
HI i ,t -1*D
7689 0.0796 0.1961 HI i ,t -1*D
7689 -2.4582 -10.5871 ***
HI i ,t -1*D
9000 -1.2618 -3.7576 *** HI i ,t -1*D
9000 -1.9796 -11.2853 ***
HI i ,t -1*D
0105 -0.3186 -2.5015 ** HI i ,t -1*D
0105 -1.1917 -24.7775 ***
D SMLBANK 0.3705 9.8781 *** 0.3029 5.7440 *** D SMLBANK 0.0897 9.5884 *** 0.1806 9.8701 ***
D MEDBANK 0.4145 11.4563 *** 0.3821 7.6686 *** D MEDBANK 0.0953 10.3644 *** 0.1838 10.1481 ***
D LARBANK 0.5626 16.5634 *** 0.5471 11.5179 *** D LARBANK 0.1036 9.5136 *** 0.1821 9.8694 ***
D HUGBANK 0.3628 9.9574 *** 0.3544 7.0592 *** D HUGBANK 0.0995 7.9288 *** 0.1804 10.0970 ***
D MERGER 0.0521 3.8112 *** 0.0344 2.2622 ** D MERGER 0.0132 2.1420 ** 0.0125 2.3936 **
D LTCB 0.1862 6.4472 *** 0.0769 2.6175 *** D LTCB 0.0017 0.2762 -0.0085 -1.4141
D FHC -0.0862 -6.1316 *** -0.1115 -5.7451 *** D FHC 0.0454 6.6030 *** 0.0002 0.0165
AGE t -0.0004 -2.2245 ** -0.0004 -2.2711 ** AGE t -0.00003 -0.4502 0.0001 1.2258
LA i,t 0.1682 3.3809 *** 0.5268 6.4990 *** ∆LA i,t -0.1102 -0.7683 -0.6206 -3.9290 ***
DA i,t 0.6189 13.9704 *** 0.3808 7.0306 *** ∆DA i,t 0.7620 6.5925 *** 0.3872 2.9075 ***
SDROA i -47.1487 -7.3962 *** -54.6401 -8.9812 *** SDROA i -8.2640 -2.3280 ** -3.7070 -1.0905
[P value] [P value]
Value function Value function
Table 4.  Robustness check: Asset growth
This table shows the results for the GMM estimation of the growth and the efficiency regressions. The specifications are the same as those in Table 2, except that the dependent variable in the growth regression is banks'
asset level lnA i,t  (in Panel (A)) or asset growth ΔlnA i,t  (in Panel (B)).  ***, **, and * respectively represent that the estimated coefficient is significant at the 1%, 5%, or 10% level.
(A) Dependent variable: ln A i,t  for the growth regression and EF i,t  for the efficiency regression (B) Dependent variable: Δln Ai,t  for the growth regression and ΔEF i,t  for the efficiency regression
Obs. Obs.
Order of MA for the error
term
Order of MA for the error
term
Test for overidentification Test for overidentification
384 384
Growth
regression
Efficiency
regression
Growth
regression
Efficiency
regression
(i) Baseline regression (ii) With period dummies
NA
(i) Baseline regression (ii) With period dummies
NA NA
NA NA
NA
NA NA
NA NA
NA NA
     0.3907 (Growth reg.)      0.4102 (Growth reg.)      0.2472 (Growth reg.)
     0.5083 (Efficiency reg.)R
2 R2
384 384
NA NA
NA NA
     0.2207 (Growth reg.)
     0.4140 (Efficiency reg.)     0.4949 (Efficiency reg.)      0.3559 (Efficiency reg.)
0.1174 0.1169 0.1095 0.1090
10 10 3 5
45.0666 44.873
[0.553] [0.561] [0.677] [0.685]
42.0602 41.8537
7689
1γ
9000
1γ
0105
1γ
2γ
3γ
4γ
5γ
1β
7689
1β
9000
1β
0105
1β
2β
4β
5β
6β
7β
8β
9β
10β
11β
11β 2
0γ
1γ
